







Social rationality, separability,  




Marc Fleurbaey, Thibault Gajdos 













Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 





 CORE DISCUSSION PAPER 
2010/37 
 
Social rationality, separability,  
and equity under uncertainty 
 
Marc FLEURBAEY 1, Thibault GAJDOS2  
and Stéphane ZUBER







Harsanyi (1955) proved that, in the context of uncertainty, social ratio- nality and the Pareto principle 
impose severe constraints on the degree of priority for the worst-off that can be adopted in the social 
evaluation. Since then, the literature has hesitated between an ex ante approach that relaxes rationality 
(Diamond (1967)) and an ex post approach that fails the Pareto principle (Hammond (1983), Broome 
(1991)).  The  Hammond-Broome  ex  post  approach  conveniently  retains  the  separable  form  of 
utilitarianism but does not make it explicit how to give priority to the worst-off, and how much disre- 
spect of individual preferences this implies. Fleurbaey (2008) studies how to incorporate a priority for 
the worst-off in an explicit formulation, but leaves aside the issue of ex ante equity in lotteries, 
retaining a restrictive form of consequentialism. We extend the analysis to a framework allowing for 
ex ante equity considerations to play a role in the ex post approach, and find a richer configuration of 
possible criteria. But the general outlook of the Harsanyian dilemma is confirmed in this more general 
setting. 
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the authors. 1 Introduction
Harsanyi (1955) has presented a theorem that has attracted a lot of attention. The
theorem says that in the context of lotteries, if the individuals and the social ob-
server are expected utility maximizers, the Pareto principle applied to individual
expected utilities over lotteries implies that the von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM)
utility of the social observer is ane with respect to the vector of individual VNM
utilities. While Harsanyi viewed this result as a key argument in a justication
of utilitarianism, many commentators understood it as a negative result. Namely,
the combination of respect for individual preferences (Pareto) and social rational-
ity (expected utility on behalf of the social observer) imposes severe constraints on
the degree of priority for the worst-o. The social observers who want to be more
egalitarian than allowed by Harsanyi's theorem have to choose between irrational-
ity and paternalism, two great evils in mainstream welfare economics. The former
occurs when one adopts the \ex ante" approach in which an inequality-averse social
criterion is applied to individual expected utilities, while the latter haunts the \ex
post" approach in which one computes the expected value of an inequality-averse
social welfare function.
Hammond (1983) and Broome (1991) have proposed a version of the ex post
approach in which the form of Harsanyi's utilitarianism is retained, but individual
utilities are reinterpreted as the contribution to social welfare brought by individual
situations. This approach is most elegant, but these authors have not explored in
detail how to incorporate a priority for the worst-o in the measurement of individual
utilities, and how much divorce with individual preferences over lotteries this would
imply. As a consequence, their theories remain too abstract and implicit for concrete
applications.
In a famous critique often invoked by the advocates of the ex ante approach, Dia-
mond (1967) questioned the idea of requiring a social observer to maximize expected
social welfare. Randomizing the allocation of a prize may not change the inequality
in the nal distribution signicantly but may bring greater ex ante fairness between
individuals. While Diamond focused on a critique of the independence axiom of
the expected utility theorem, it was later noted (Machina (1989), Grant (1995))
that following Diamond on his prize example actually implies greater violations of
rationality, and in particular a violation of dynamic consistency and stochastic dom-
inance. While a x can be proposed for dynamic consistency (Epstein and Segal
(1992)), the issue of dominance is more serious. A natural step, in this respect, is
to adopt a richer description of the consequences, so that one can make the dier-
ence among nal consequences obtained with or without a fair lottery. With such a
1richer description of consequences, Diamond's critique seems powerless against the
ex post approach which is then able to combine rationality and a concern for ex ante
fairness.1
Hammond (1981) observed that when individual beliefs on probabilities are not
trustworthy, respecting their ex ante preferences is not as compelling as in the case
of full information. Fleurbaey (2008) argued that this is actually the general case, as
probabilistic beliefs are generally dierent from actual probabilities. Truly enough,
the social observer's own beliefs may not be much more reliable in general. However,
Fleurbaey noted that in situations of randomized prizes as in Diamond's example,
there is an interesting dierence between a social observer who is sure of the nal
distribution of utilities and individuals who do not know their own nal utility. Such
situations are not risky for the observer and this may justify disrespecting individual
preferences: preventing individuals from taking some risk is in the interest of the
future losers, who are bound to exist and are ex ante ignorant of their true interests.
Dropping the Pareto principle, however, does not fully eliminate the diculty.
The argument of the previous paragraph only applies in cases of sure inequalities
and the Pareto principle remains compelling when equality is preserved in all pos-
sible consequences. Fleurbaey shows that retaining the Pareto principle in cases
of perfect equality and combining it with dominance singles out a social criterion:
maximizing the expected value of the equally-distributed equivalent utility (Atkin-
son (1970)). This criterion is nice in several respects but it is strongly non-separable
across subpopulations, as the equally-distributed equivalent utility in a state of na-
ture will typically depend on the whole vector of utilities in that state. Therefore,
the bulk of Harsanyi's theorem is preserved if one adds a requirement of separability
across subpopulations.
Some separability is required in particular if, in practical applications, one wants
to be able to make decisions for future risks independently of the utility of those who
have lived in the distant past. This requirement of \Independence of the Utility of
the Dead", introduced in Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005), seems attrac-
tive if only for practical convenience. In summary, the dilemma for an inequality-
averse social observer seems to involve three evils rather than just two: irrationality,
paternalism, non-separability.
Fleurbaey's analysis shares with the Hammond-Broome theory the unpalatable
feature that it is not fully explicit. While it is explicit about inequality aversion,
it leaves it implicit how to incorporate a concern for ex ante fairness in the mea-
1See Adler and Sanchirico (2006) for a rich discussion of these issues and an endorsement of the
ex post approach.
2surement of nal utilities. Formally, it retains a narrow form of consequentialism
in which the evaluation of ex post consequences in a particular state of nature only
involves the utilities obtained in this state of nature. The interplay between ex ante
fairness and ex post inequality aversion is therefore left unexplored. In this paper,
we set out to analyze the form of the dilemma when the evaluation of ex post conse-
quences may involve the counterfactual utilities of other states of nature. Formally,
this means that the requirement of dominance becomes much less constraining.
We also extend the analysis in another direction. Unlike many papers pursuing
Harsanyi's work,2 we will not assume that the evaluation of ex ante individual
prospects, as referred to in the Pareto principle, is based on expected utility. In
this way the analysis gains in generality and the negative results, if any, become
even more problematic. Our results are not totally negative but they show that the
essence of the dilemma remains. More precisely, we show that the combination of
rationality and separability imposes such constraints on the social criterion that the
dilemma between paternalism and priority for the worst-o is unescapable.
The structure of the paper is straightforward. In Section 2 the framework is
presented, followed in Section 3 by the axioms that embody the requirements we
want to impose on the social criterion. The results are stated in Section 4 and
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are gathered in Section
7.
2 Setup
The framework involves state-contingent alternatives,3 with a nite set of states of
nature S = f1;:::;sg. The population is a nite set N = f1;:::;ng.
The objects of evaluation are prospects (u;z), in which u 2 U = Rns is a
utility matrix such that ui is the utility obtained by i 2 N in state  2 S, and
z 2 Z denotes any ex ante non-utility information about states of nature (such as
probabilities of occurrence) that may be relevant for the evaluation. The set Z is
assumed to be a separable metric space. Let ui = (ui)2S and u = (ui)i2N . Let
u i = (uj)j2N nfig, and for M  N , uM = (ui)i2M.
The subset of sure prospects, i.e., of prospects u such that u = u for all
; 2 S, is denoted U c. The subset of egalitarian prospects, i.e., of prospects u
such that ui = uj for all i;j 2 N , is denoted U e:
2Notable exceptions are Blackorby, Donaldson, and Mongin (2004), Gajdos, Tallon, and
Vergnaud (2008).
3For the adaptation of Harsanyi's theorem to such a framework, see Blackorby, Donaldson, and
Weymark (1999).
3The utility gure ui must be interpreted as measuring the utility obtained by
individual i in state , without consideration of inequality in society or fairness in
the lottery. The goal of this paper is to dene how to incorporate such considera-
tions explicitly in the social evaluation. In contrast, the value of ui may include
everything that is relevant in i's personal ex post situation, including the utility
consequences of bearing risk in the ex ante situation. For instance, if i has taken
a great risk and suered anxiety, this may yield a low ui even in a lucky state of
nature. We do not explicitly model individual preferences under uncertainty and
the underlying economic allocations. We work directly with utility consequences.
Ex ante, the social planner faces a prospect (u;z) 2 U Z . Ex post, the social
planner faces a situation (u;z;) 2 U Z S. We are interested in three preference
orderings, which are all supposed to belong to the same ethical observer who seeks
to make a coherent assessment of ex ante prospects and ex post consequences.
 Ex post preferences on individual situations, denoted R, bearing on (ui;z;) 2
Rs  Z  S.
Such preferences do not bear only on ui because what could have happened
in other (non-realized) states of nature may be important in order to assess
whether the individual has been fairly treated.
 Ex post preferences on social situations, denoted Rp, bearing on (u;z;) 2
U  Z  S.
Again, such preferences do not only bear on (u;z;), because utility in coun-
terfactual states may carry relevant information.
 Ex ante preferences on social prospects, denoted Ra; bearing on (u;z) 2 UZ:
Let P and I denote the strict preference and indierence relations, respectively,
corresponding to R. The relations P p, Ip, P a; and Ia are dened similarly.
3 Axioms
The axioms we want to impose on this triple of orderings fall under three headings:
social rationality, individualism and separability. We do not introduce specic ax-
ioms that would capture the ideals of priority for the worst-o and ex ante fairness.
The results we obtain make it clear how such ideals can be satised in combination
with the axioms studied in this paper. This will be discussed in Section 5.
43.1 Social rationality
Harsanyi (1955) requires the social criterion to take the form of expected welfare. We
also make rationality assumptions, but in a more general form that encompasses non-
expected utility criteria and turns out, as we shall see, to be formally weak enough to
accommodate the ex ante approach. First, the relations under consideration should
be complete and continuous preorders.
Axiom 1 (Ordering). The three relations R;Rp;Ra are transitive, reexive, com-
plete, and continuous.4
The key rationality axioms are dominance and independence. Dominance means
that an improvement in all possible consequences for the dierent states of nature
must yield a global improvement. This is really the minimal requirement of social
rationality.
Axiom 2 (Dominance). For all u;u0 2 U , z;z0 2 Z ,








8 2 S; (u;z;)Rp(u0;z0;)






Independence is formulated here in a way that remains compatible with many
non-expected utility approaches, because it is applied in a way that takes account
of the whole matrix u in the evaluation of ex post consequences. This is therefore a
rather weak axiom.
Axiom 3 (Independence). For all u;v;u0;v0 2 U , y;z;y0;z0 2 Z and all T  S,
8 2 T; (u;y;)Ip(v;z;)
8 2 T; (u0;y0;)Ip(v0;z0;)
8 2 S n T; (u;y;)Ip(u0;y0;)
8 2 S n T; (v;z;)Ip(v0;z0;)
9
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The next axiom is meant to rule out degenerate criteria for which the evaluation
of ex post consequences is only based on ex ante information.5 Introduced by Ski-
adas (1997), it requires sucient richness in the possible evaluation of the ex post
consequences of a given prospect.
4A relation ~ R on X is said to be continuous if, for all x 2 X, the sets fy 2 X j x ~ Ryg and
fy 2 X j y ~ Rxg are closed.
5In fact, such criteria are not completely excluded by this axiom. See footnote 9.
5Axiom 4 (Solvability). For all ((u1;z1); ;(us;zs)) 2 (U  Z )
s, there exists
(u;z) 2 U  Z such that for all  2 S; (u;z;)Ip(u;z;):
We also introduce axioms that require a certain form of simplicity in the evalu-
ation of nal situations in dierent states. First, we require the role of states to be
symmetric in the ex ante evaluation, as observed for instance in expected utilities
which are sums of terms representing the contribution of each state to the expected
value, each term being the product of the probability of the state by the utility
attained in the state.
Axiom 5 (State Neutrality). For all u;u0 2 U , z;z0 2 Z , if there exists a permuta-
tion  : S ! S such that (u;z;)Ip(u0;z0;()) for all  2 S, then (u;z)Ia(u0;z0).
The next axiom requires that for riskless prospects, the contribution of each state
to ex ante evaluation is equal for some informational congurations (e.g., equiprob-
able states in the case of expected utility).
Axiom 6 (State Equivalence). There exists Z c  Z such that for all u 2 U c;




In Harsanyi (1955), individualism is embodied in the Pareto principle applied to ex
ante prospects. As noted in Hammond (1981) and emphasized in Fleurbaey (2008),
the Pareto principle is not compelling when applied to uncertain prospects because
unanimity among future winners and losers may be obtained only because they
ignore their ultimate interests. We therefore limit the application of this principle
to ex post consequences, in which full information prevails.
Axiom 7 (Ex Post Pareto). For all u;u0 2 U , z;z0 2 Z and ;0 2 S,










8i 2 N ; (ui;z;)R(u0
i;z0;0)








We also introduce a monotonicity axiom made of two parts. The rst one is
standard, and requires that the evaluation of individual situations is increasing in the
components of the prospects.6 The second part of the axiom essentially requires that
6We therefore implicitly assume that for all z in Z, there is no null state.
6dierences in information can always be compensated in the evaluation of individual
situations by increasing or decreasing the prospect itself. Formally, this axiom is
stated as follows.7
Axiom 8 (Monotonicity).











2. There exists z 2 Z c such that, for all ui 2 Rs,  2 S and z 2 Z, there exists




Finally, we require individuals to be treated equally.
Axiom 9 (Anonymity). For all u;u0 2 U , z 2 Z ,  2 S, if there exists a






Harsanyi (1955) derives a separable (indeed, additive) social ordering from the com-
bination of social rationality and ex ante Pareto. With the axioms introduced so
far very little separability is obtained, and it appears interesting to study a quite
attractive principle of separability. This principle says that individuals who are not
concerned and bear no risk should not inuence the social evaluation. Individuals
are not concerned when their personal situation is the same in the two prospects un-
der consideration. This principle is inspired by the observation that in its absence,
for practical applications of the criteria studied here, one should either take account
of the utility of dead people in the evaluation of prospects,8 or ignore it and violate
dynamic consistency.
We introduce two axioms capturing this idea. The rst literally embodies the
separability principle as just stated.
7For two vectors x;y; x > y means that x  y and x 6= y.
8The principle of \independence of the utility of the dead"has been introduced by Blackorby,
Bossert, and Donaldson (2005). It is also invoked in Bommier and Zuber (2008).
7Axiom 10 (Independence of the Utility of the Sure). For all u;u0 2 U , v;v0 2 U c,














The second says that when the subgroup that takes risks and is concerned is
perfectly egalitarian in all possible states of nature, then the evaluation should
proceed as if the whole society was doing the same. This means that, in this special
case, the mere presence of unconcerned and risk-free individuals has no inuence on
the evaluation, a property that is not guaranteed under the previous axiom.
Axiom 11 (Restricted Independence of the Sure). For all u;u0 2 U e, v 2 U c,









4 Two families of social criteria
In the standard consequentialist framework, Axiom 10 (Independence of the Utility
of the Sure) implies the following strong form of ex post separability (see Blackorby,
Bossert, and Donaldson (2005) or Bommier and Zuber (2008)), which can also be
justied normatively (see Broome (1991)).
Axiom 12 (Ex Post Separability). For all u;v;u0;v0 2 U , z;z0 2 Z , s;s0 2 S; and
M  N ,
8i 2 M; ui = vi
8i 2 M; u0
i = v0
i
8i 2 N n M; (ui;z;)I(u0
i;z0;0)
8i 2 N n M; (vi;z;)I(v0
i;z0;0)
9
> > > > =










A similar implication can be obtained in our extended framework, as shown by
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Axioms 1 (Ordering), 2 (Dominance), 6 (State Equivalence), 7 (Ex Post
Pareto), 8 (Monotonicity) and 10 (Independence of the Utility of the Sure) imply
Axiom 12 (Ex Post Separability).
We are now ready to state our rst main result. The principles introduced in
Section 3 make it possible to single out two broad families of social criteria.
8Proposition 1. If Axioms 1 (Ordering), 2 (Dominance), 3 (Independence), 4 (Solv-
ability), 5 (State Neutrality), 6 (State Equivalence), 7 (Ex Post Pareto), 8 (Mono-
tonicity) and 10 (Independence of the Utility of the Sure) are satised, then:
1. there exists a continuous function ' : Rs Z S ! R, increasing in its rst
s arguments and satisfying '(ui;z;) = '(ui;z;0) for all ;0 2 S, u 2 U c
and z 2 Z c, such that for all ui;u0










2. there exist n continuous increasing functions 'i : R ! R such that for all



































and for all i 2 N there exists a continuous increasing function  i and a
continuous function i such that for all u 2 U c,
P
2S 'i  '(ui;z;) =
 i(ui1) + i(z).






























and for all i 2 N there exists a continuous increasing function #i and
a continuous function i such that for all u 2 U c, 'i  '(ui;z;) =
#i(ui1) + i(z;).
Note that we do not provide necessary and sucient conditions for all the axioms
to be satised. This is because Axiom 4 (Solvability) and the second part of Axiom
8 (Monotonicity) impose conditions that are not specially interesting, and a little
heavy to write. However, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Assume R, Rp and Ra are dened as in Proposition 1. Then
Axioms 1 (Ordering), 2 (Dominance), 3 (Independence), 5 (State Neutrality), 6
9(State Equivalence), 7 (Ex Post Pareto), 10 (Independence of the Utility of the
Sure), and the rst part of Axiom 8 (Monotonicity) are satised.
While the additive family (a) in Proposition 1 is reminiscent of Harsanyi's result,
the exponential one (b) looks more singular. However, when Axioms 9 (Anonymity)
and 11 (Restricted Independence of the Sure) are added, only the additive family
remains.
Proposition 3. If Axioms 1 (Ordering), 2 (Dominance), 3 (Independence), 4 (Solv-
ability), 5 (State Neutrality), 6 (State Equivalence), 7 (Ex Post Pareto), 8 (Mono-
tonicity), 9 (Anonymity), 10 (Independence of the Utility of the Sure) and 11
(Restricted Independence of the Sure) are satised then there exists a continu-
ous function ' : Rs  Z  S ! R that is increasing in its rst s arguments
and satises '(ui;z;) = '(ui;z;0) for all ;0 2 S, u 2 U c and z 2 Z c and
P
2S '(ui;z;) =  (u1
i)+(z) for all u 2 U c, where   is continuous and increasing
and  is continuous, and such that:
1. for all ui;u0













































Let us review the various possible social criteria that are singled out or ruled out
by our results. In order to do so, it is useful to specify a little more the notion
of individual ex ante utility. We will assume that it can be denoted Ezui, without
implying that this must be an expected utility.
In the analysis, indeed, we have relied on substantial requirements of social
rationality and separability, but left a secondary role for individualism and the
respect of individual preferences. However, it is easy to see what happens if such





10If u 2 U e; i.e., if u is perfectly egalitarian in all states of nature, the criterion boils
down to maximizing
P
2S '(ui;z;): If this formula is congruent with individual
ex ante utility (which appears reasonable when there is no inequality), there is
an increasing function G such that
P
2S '(ui;z;)  G(Ezui). This implies
that for all u 2 U ; not just egalitarian prospects, the social criterion is based on
P
i2N G(Ezui): It is clear that this criterion takes no account whatsoever of ex post
inequalities and focuses at most on ex ante inequalities. Therefore Prop. 3 implies
that there is a clear dilemma between respecting ex ante individual utility in absence
of inequalities and giving priority to the worst-o in every state of nature.
Therefore, in comparison with the more restrictive analysis in Fleurbaey (2008),
allowing for a richer evaluation of nal consequences that takes account of counter-
factual states makes it possible here to combine ex ante inequality aversion with ex
post rationality, separability, and some respect of ex ante utility. The introduction
of ex post inequality aversion remains problematic.
However, even ex ante inequality aversion raises some diculty in our setting.
Let us look again at the identity
P
2S '(ui;z;)  G(Ezui): If Ezui is linear
in the vector ui (as in expected utility or rank-dependent expected utility), and if
'(ui;z;) is more sensitive to ui than to the other components of ui; we almost
have a Pexider equation | this is exactly a Pexider equation if '(ui;z;) depends
only on the component ui; as in the strict form of consequentialism adopted in
Fleurbaey (2008).
It is therefore dicult for G to be strictly concave. Let us illustrate this with
an example. Suppose that '(ui;z;) = fz
 (ui + (1   )Ezui): It is easy to make
sense of such a form, the evaluation of a nal situation depending jointly on ex post





 (ui + (1   )Ezui) = G(Ezui):
If Ezui is linear in the vector ui; it is also linear in (ui + (1   )Ezui)s2S and we
then really have a Pexider equation, unless  = 0: Therefore, if Ezui is linear in the
vector ui the dilemma is the following: either G is ane, so that there is no ex ante
inequality aversion in Ra; or  = 0; meaning that the ex post evaluation '(ui;z;)
is based solely on the ex ante information contained in Ezui | a rather absurd kind
of ex post evaluation according to which \bad luck does not hurt".9
9Solvability is meant to rule out this degenerate kind of ex post evaluation, but does not exclude
it completely. Letting P(z;) be the probability of state  2 S when the information is z 2 Z ,
suppose that '(ui;z;) = P(z;)G(Ezui) and that the range of G(Ezui) for ui 2 Rs is R+: Then
Solvability is satised by adjusting z jointly with ui:
11Therefore, even though a seemingly ex ante criterion such as
P
i2N G(Ezui) can
be surprisingly reconciled with our ex post approach because our Dominance and
Independence axioms are weak enough, this is obtained at the cost of making the
ex post criteria Rp and R unreasonable.
We illustrate these dilemmas in Fig. 1 which gives examples of criteria Ra and




































i2N (ui + (1   )Ezui)
Figure 1
Let us now move backward and examine another possibility left open in Prop. 1












To compare with the above discussion and to ensure Independence of the Utility
of the Sure (see Prop. 1), assume that '(ui;z;) = 1
n

(z;) + f(ui + (1  
)Ezui)

. For instance, one can take (z;) =
lnP(z;)
 , where P(z;) is the proba-













ui + (1   )Ezui
!
:
This criterion embodies a concern for ex ante and ex post inequality as well as for
ex ante fairness. The cost is of course to lose Restricted Independence of the Sure.
The criterion can also be made consistent with the respect of ex ante individual













 . One problem with this criterion however is that it is not
well dened when ui + (1   )Ezui <  . Hence the dilemmas exposed above
cannot be solved satisfactorily on the whole space U even when relaxing Restricted
Independence of the Sure.
Moving backward again, it appears that the exponential criterion belongs to a
broader family. One may indeed question Independence of Utility of the Sure and
examine what can be obtained in this way. It is then easy to rene the criterion
proposed by Fleurbaey (2008) in order to take account of ex ante fairness. For
instance, let '(ui;z;) = P(z;)f (ui + (1   )Ezui) with f a strictly concave,









f (uis + (1   )Ezui)
!










f (uis + (1   )Ezui)
!
:
This expression is very similar to the one obtained for the exponential case. Like
the exponential criterion, it embodies a concern for ex ante and ex post inequality
as well as for ex ante fairness. When u 2 U e; it boils down to Ezui and therefore
respects individual utility in absence of inequality. It satises all the axioms of our
list except the separability axioms and Ex Post Pareto, and allows for any nite
degree of inequality aversion.
6 Conclusion
The general outlook of our results is negative. In a framework that allows for an
explicit incorporation of ex ante and ex post inequality aversion and ex ante fairness
in the social evaluation of risky prospects, a list of reasonable axioms that capture
basic notions of social rationality, individualism and separability impose such con-
straints on the social ordering that no fully satisfactory candidate is singled out.
13Inequality aversion enters in conict with a minimal respect of individual ex ante
utility, and this occurs whether one is interested in ex post or even simply ex ante
inequality aversion. The conict is alleviated only if separability is relaxed.
A more positive conclusion is that we have found general conditions that single





assuming a strict form of consequentialism. Although we have directly assumed
separability across states of nature via the Independence axiom, separability across
subpopulation has been introduced only through weak separability axioms involving
the subpopulations who take no risk. Another positive result is the exponential
criterion which, even though it fails some attractive axioms, illustrates how a specic
moderate degree of inequality aversion may be imposed by the analysis.
We believe our axioms to be all reasonable, but the list is long and we are not
able to show that each of them is needed in our results. This is the cost to pay
for a very exible framework with very weak rationality conditions. Our conditions
are so weak that ex ante criteria of the form
P
i2N G(Ezui) can fulll them, but in
a rather implausible way as far as ex post evaluation is concerned. The dilemmas
identied in this paper therefore deserve to be further explored in order to pin down
the key principles of rationality, individualism and separability which are responsible
for the diculty. In particular, one may think that Continuity, Solvability, and State
Neutrality are mostly technical requirements and it would be very interesting to see
what happens to our two main results without them. This is left for future research.
7 Proofs
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let u;v;u0;v0 2 U , z;z0 2 Z , ;0 2 S, and M  N be such that
8i 2 M; ui = vi
8i 2 M; u0
i = v0
i
8i 2 N n M; (ui;z;)I(u0
i;z0;0)
8i 2 N n M; (vi;z;)I(v0
i;z0;0):
Let z 2 Z c be as dened in Axiom 8 (Monotonicity). By Axioms 1 (Ordering)
and 8 (Monotonicity), for all i 2 N there is a sure  ui such that (ui;z;)I ( ui;z;)
and a sure  u0
i such that (u0
i;z0;0)I ( u0
i;z;0): Similarly there is a sure  vi such that
(vi;z;)I ( vi;z;) and a sure  v0
i such that (v0
i;z0;0)I ( v0
i;z;0): For all i 2 M;  ui =
 vi and  u0
i =  v0
i: For all i 2 N n M, ( ui;z;)I ( u0
i;z;0) and ( vi;z;)I ( v0
i;z;0),
which, by Axiom 6 (State Equivalence), implies  ui =  u0
i and  vi =  v0
i:




















Suppose that (u;z;)Rp (u0;z0;0), which, by transitivity, is equivalent to
( u;z;)Rp ( u0;z;0): By Axiom 6 (State Equivalence), ( u;z;)Rp ( u0;z;) for
all  2 S. By Axiom 2 (Dominance), ( u;z)Ra ( u0;z).
By Axiom 10 (Independence of Utility of the Sure),
  









































Suppose one had ( v0;z;0)P p ( v;z;). Then, by Axioms 6 (State Equivalence)
and 2 (Dominance), one would have ( v0;z)P a ( v;z), a contradiction. Therefore,
( v;z;)Rp ( v0;z;0). By transitivity, (v;z;)Rp(v0;z0;0).










By symmetry, the converse holds.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Claim 1. There exists a continuous function ' : RsZ S ! R, increasing in its
rst s arguments and satisfying '(ui;z;) = '(ui;z;0) for all ;0 2 S, u 2 U c
and z 2 Z c, such that for all ui;u0










Proof. By Axiom 1 (Ordering), there is a real-valued continuous function ' that
represents R. By Axiom 8 (Monotonicity), it is increasing in each component of ui.
By Axiom 6 (State Equivalence), it must be the case that '(ui;z;) = '(ui;z;0)
for all ;0 2 S, u 2 U c and z 2 Z c.
15Claim 2. There exist n continuous increasing functions 'i : R ! R such that for
















Proof. By Axiom 1 (Ordering) and 7 (Ex Post Pareto), there is a continuous and











By Lemma 1, Axiom 12 (Ex Post Separability) holds, so that the ordering over
(rge')n represented by   is separable. Therefore, there exist n continuous functions
















By Axiom 7 (Ex Post Pareto), each 'i is increasing.
Claim 3. There exists a continuous and increasing function 	 : R ! R such that



























Proof. Dene  (u;z;) =
P
i2N 'i  '(ui;z;). The function   is continuous and
increasing in each component of u.
By Axiom 4 (Solvability),






s2S rge (;;). Dene  on D as follows: a  b i there exist u;u0 2 U ,
z;z0 2 Z ,
8 2 S;  (u;z;) = a






By Axioms 1 (Ordering), 2 (Dominance) and 4 (Solvability),  is a well-dened,
complete and continuous ordering, as we now show.
10For any function f, rgef denotes the range of f.
16First, observe that  is well-dened. Indeed, let u;v;u0;v0 2 U and y;z;y0;z0 2
Z be such that for all  2 S,  (u;z;) =  (v;y;) = a and  (u0;z0;) =
 (v0;y0;) = b. This implies that for all  2 S, (u;z;)Ip(v;y;) and (u0;z0;)Ip(v0;y0;).








Since D = f( (u;z;))2Sj(u;z) 2 U  Z g and Ra is complete,  is also com-
plete.
Finally, we show that  is continuous. The function    : U  Z ! D dened
by   (u;z) = ( (u;z;))2S is continuous. Consider any b 2 D and the set A =
fa 2 Dja  bg. Let v;y be such that   (v;y) = b. The set A is the image by    of
the set
f(u;z) 2 U  Z j(u;z)R
a(v;y)g:
As Ra is continuous, this set is closed. Since    is continuous, A is also closed. A
similar argument shows that the set fa 2 Djb  ag is closed as well, and therefore
 is continuous.
By Axiom 2 (Dominance),  is strictly monotonic in each component. By Axiom
3 (Independence), it is separable. By Axiom 5 (State Neutrality), it is symmetric,
i.e., indierent to permutations of components.
Therefore there exists a continuous and increasing function 	 : R ! R such that
for all a;b 2 D,







Claim 4. One can restrict attention either to 	(x) = x or to 	(x) = ex for some
 2 R n f0g.
Proof. Let fC;Rg be a partition of N , with jCj  2, and let z 2 Z c. Let U c
C  U
be the subset of matrices u such that uC is risk-free. Finally, let r = jRj.
For i 2 N and x 2 R; let i(x) = 'i  '((x;:::;x);z;). Note that by Axiom 6
(State Equivalence) this value does not depend on . Each function i is continuous
and increasing. Without loss of generality, we can impose i(0) = 0.
By Axiom 10 (Independence of the Utility of the Sure), for Ra the subset R[A
is separable for all A   C (including A = ;). Therefore, by Theorem 1 in Gorman
(1968), every subset of C, including C itself, is also separable. By Corollary of
Theorem 1 in Gorman (1968), there exist continuous functions h : Rrs ! R and





) , h(uR) +
X
i2C


























Fixing uR, one sees that this implies that there is an increasing function  g such that












i = ^ i  
 1












This is a variant of the Pexider equation, implying that  g and 
i must be ane
(Rado and Baker (1987)), so that there exist ,  such that i(ui1) = ^ i(ui1) + i.
As a result, one can simplify equation (1) and write that there exists an increasing





































































18Dening x = 	
 P
































i2R 'i  '(ui;z;)

2S
for uR 2 Rrs. As the functions 	 and 'i' are continuous in the relevant arguments,
this set has a connected non-empty interior. Therefore the equation implies that
both sides are ane in x. That is, letting t =
P





 1 (x) + t

= (t)x + (t);
or equivalently, letting y = 	 1(x) =
P
i2R 'i  '(ui;z;);
	(y + t) = (t)	(y) + (t):
By Corollary 1 (p. 150-151) in Acz el (1966) this equation implies that 	(x) is ane
in x or ane in ex for some  6= 0.
Claim 5. For all u 2 U c and i 2 N it must be the case that
1. when 	(x) = x,
P
2S 'i  '(u;z;) =  i(ui1) + i(z) where  i is continuous
and increasing and i is continuous
2. when 	(x) = ex, 'i  '(u;z;) = #i(ui1) + i(z;) where #i is continuous
and increasing and i is continuous.
Proof. Case 1: 	(x) = x. Let u;u0 2 U , v;v0 2 U c, z 2 Z and z0 2 Z a reference
informational content (for instance, equiprobable states of the world). By Axiom 10












Using the representation in Case 1, this means that:
X
2S





'j  '(uj;z;) 
X
2S



































2S 'i '(vi;z0;) is independent of





19i(z). Denoting  i(vi1) =
P
2S 'i  '(vi;z0;) yields the result. Axioms 1 (Order-
ing) and 8 (Monotonicity) imply the properties of  i and i.
Case 2: 	(x) = ex. Let u;u0 2 U , v 2 U c, z 2 Z . Let 0 denotes the sure
prospect in Rs with all its components equal to 0. By Axiom 10 (Independence of








Using the representation in Case 2, and assuming without loss of generality that




























































Let Diz = f(d1; ;ds) 2 Rs : 9u 2 U ;8 2 S;d =
P
j6=i 'j  '(uj;z;)g. Diz









ed. By the above result, the following two




2S g(d). By the
unicity of additive representations up to an increasing ane transformation, there
must exists a > 0 and scalars b such that f = ag + b. In view of the forms of
functions f and g, we need b = 0 for all  2 S.
To sum up, for every sure vi and all  2 S, there exists a(vi) such that exp('i
'(vi;z;)) = a(vi)exp('i  '(0;z;)). Denoting #i(vi1) =
lna(vi)
 and i(z;) =
'i  '(0;z;), we obtain that 'i  '(u;z;) = #i(ui1) + i(z;). The properties of
#i and i follow from Axioms 1 (Ordering) and 8 (Monotonicity) .
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. It is immediate to see that the dened orderings satisfy Axioms 1 (Ordering),
2 (Dominance), 3 (Independence), 5 (State Neutrality), 7 (Ex Post Pareto), and the
rst part of 8 (Monotonicity).
The condition '(ui;z;) = '(ui;z;0) for all u 2 U c and z 2 Z c guarantees
that they satisfy Axiom 6 (State Equivalence).
20For Axiom 10 (Independence of Utility of the Sure), consider M  N and



















































This is clearly independent of v, in accordance with Axiom 10 (Independence of
Utility of the Sure).
In the case 	(x) = exp(x), and assuming without loss of generality that










































































This is also independent of v.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
By Proposition 1, we know that there exist functions ', ('i)i2N such that for all
















21By Axiom 9 (Anonymity), one can take the ('i)i2N to be identical. Letting '
denote 'i  ', we then obtain the rst two equivalences of this proposition.















































Suppose the latter is true, and assume without loss of generality that  > 0.
Consider u;u0 2 U e; v 2 U c, M  N with m = jMj and z 2 Z . By Axiom 11
































































Let X = f(exp('(ui;z;)))2Sjui 2 Rsg, and a = exp((z;s)). We have ob-



















This is possible only if there is a 2 Rs
++ such that for all x 2 X, there is  2 R++,
22x = a. This argument applies to all z 2 Z . This implies that for all (ui;z) 2
Rs  Z , there is (ui;z) 2 R, '(ui;z;) = (ui;z) + lna
 . The function  must be
increasing in ui: Let  = lna
 .
Dene  (u;z;) =
P







2 (U Z )s. One has, for all  2 S,
 (u;z;) = n +
P
i2N (u
i ;z). Axiom 4 (Solvability) requires that there is
(u;z) 2 U  Z such that for all  2 S,
 (u;z;) = n +
X
i2N







This is possible in general only if  is constant. This yields a contradiction.
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